

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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If, by an act of power, the Bank be protected from repaying their paper, in money, to the extent of the full reputed value, confidence will very soon be lost, and the pains of death will not, if we may judge from experience of other nations, support the credit of the paper."—HARRISON'S Investigation, p. 21.

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LORD ST. VINCENT.

SIR,—I cannot, without indignation, read a long and vulgar 'tirade' of abuse by *Brutus* against Lord St. Vincent. To repeat his charges is to refute them: viz. that the Navy Board is grown strict and punctilious in its contracts; that the Dock-yard officers are now compelled to do their duty; that the board of Admiralty issue orders which are too clear and precise to be evaded, &c. When he inveighs against the manufactory stores in the Dock-yards, though their fold superiority over all contracted articles is proverbial in the navy. But, enough. Do such absurd accusations require further refutation? Is there any one so blind as not to see the pen of a disappointed contractor in every word of them?—Then, Sir, *Brutus* levels the whole broadside of his rising oratory against blockading the enemy's fleets; and conjures administration to adopt the system which has been universally approved of in the late, and in all former wars; but, what was that system? When the French had a Brest fleet ready to come out, how else were our Channel squadrons disposed of? Why does not this ingenious tactician explain his ideas of the proper mode of employment for two adverse fleets? Let him look back at the torrent of success with which our admirals have been loaded, whenever their blockading vigilance has been eluded. I entirely agree with you, Mr. Editor, that the strictness of a blockade may be pushed too far; that a prudent commander will seize the moment when to relax, when to spare his ships; that a superiority of force may be employed upon that service; and, even that our armaments are unequally, and perhaps, imprudently distributed. But against the general principle of blockade, in so far as it relates to the watching the enemy's fleet with an equality of force, *Brutus* must bring argument founded on experience and knowledge; not those and flimsy declamations: and till then the gallant officers and seamen reject his invidious praises, which can have no other effect but to unnerve their energy and to paralyse their persevering efforts.—In a subsequent letter, I. O. censures Lord St. Vin-

cent for NOT having blockaded Toulon in 1798. And a long string of disasters is attributed to that omission. But, Sir, nothing can be more unfair than looking back through the events of a series of years, to judge the merits of a military transaction. Human abilities are not to be thus tried, the information a general can obtain, the orders he is under, the force he commands, the position of his adversaries, in short, the circumstances of the moment which press upon him, are the only elements from which honour and justice will decide upon his conduct. —Do not, Sir, imagine me the advocate of the Earl St. Vincent; there is no man who has more reason to deprecate the conduct, public and private, of that nobleman than I have; but, I cannot bear to see any public character sustaining an enormous load of business and responsibility, exposed to the petty attacks of ignorance; nor to see your pages soiled with the base insinuations of sordid and malicious interest.—I am, Sir, yours, &c. &c. T. H.

March 13th 1804.

NAVAL INQUIRY.

SIR,—The discussion in the House of Commons, on Thursday, the 15th instant, relative to the conduct of the board of Admiralty, having been the subject of general conversation and remark, I am induced to trouble you, by attempting to remove some false impressions, which the debates of that evening seem calculated to make on the public mind.—Many have supposed a spirit of party and prejudice showed itself upon this occasion very similar to what disgraced the country in the case of Admiral Keppel; but this, notwithstanding appearances, I cannot credit: the present subject is of too awful a nature, for such sentiments to have been acted upon; besides, it ought to be remembered that Lord Keppel's amiable qualities contributed greatly to produce partiality.—It has been adduced as a proof of party spirit, that there is a secret understanding between Lord St. Vincent and the Old Opposition, which is supposed to have manifested itself, by a remark of Mr. Sheridan's

respecting Sir E. Nepean's continuance in office, and that of Sir A. Hammond, although there was a known coolness between them and the First Lord. This remark of Mr. Sheridan's (whether there be a good understanding between Lord St. V. and certain members of the House, or not) is undoubtedly a very strange one, for had every man his lordship disagreed with been removed from their stations, scarce one officer or person who has served with him would, at this eventful crisis, be found in public employment. — That it should appear unaccountable to many, how the conduct of the Admiralty so generally disapproved of out of doors, and most notoriously deprecated by the navy, should be so warmly supported in the House of Commons, where impartiality and attention to the opinion of their constituents should influence every member, is not surprising. — The apparent inconsistency I conceive, is probably created by apprehension in members of being thought not to entertain a sufficiently strong and grateful recollection of the services rendered his country by the First Lord on the 14th of February, 1797. — Generally to condemn such a disposition in the representatives of a free people, who are supposed to be chosen on account of the liberality of their sentiments, and the pre-eminence of their abilities, would be reprehensible; but it may surely be allowable to express regret when this amiable bias prevails so far as to screen the individual in whose favour it operates, from all subsequent blame, however justly incurred, and it is self-evident that the most worthy are frequently seduced into error by an over great attention to claims on their gratitude. — A good sea officer may be a bad statesman. A good seaman may be a bad officer; professional knowledge being alone requisite to form the seaman, whilst decision, temper, justice, and moderation are essential qualifications for an officer. A good officer, in the true sense of the word, will rarely resort to dishonourable means, even for effecting the most desirable objects, and will carefully avoid every appearance of prejudice, partiality, or revenge. But to end this digression. In the course of Thursday's debate, the conduct of the Admiralty and Lord St. V.'s character, though not implicated in Mr. Pitt's motion, were warmly supported by the ministry and some of the old opposition, whilst Mr. Pitt's motives for bringing the question before Parliament, and those of his supporters and advisers, were by some speakers harshly censured and grossly misrepresented. — Mr. Fox appears to have voted for the inquiry,

but principally (as his speech is rendered) because inquiry would increase Lord St. V.'s credit. — Capt. Markham is made to say, that the movers of the question were actuated by personal pique. — I cannot decide how correctly given these and other speeches I propose commenting upon, may be in the public prints, they are my sole authority, but hitherto uncontradicted by better. — Mr. Tierney's, Mr. Sheridan's, and Mr. Tyrwhitt Jones', they represent as having been particularly personal and intemperate. — Mr. Pitt is insultingly asked: if he was panic struck? who were his advisers? Why they did not come forward? Doth he mean to set up his judgment, in naval matters, in opposition to the Admiralty's? — He is told, his motion smells of a contract. That he has interfered much about the volunteers, but it is to be hoped he will let the navy alone. — His advisers are represented as unemployed and disappointed officers, who are wandering about the streets deservedly neglected; whose testimony is the more suspicious as widely different from that of Sir C. Pole and Sir Edward Pellew. — Surely, Mr. Editor, a good cause cannot require or be benefited in the eyes of the public, by such support as this! Who asks if that great, that honest, that brave statesman, Mr. Pitt, is panic struck? Mr. Tierney! For shame, for shame! How indelicate! How unjust! Is Mr. Pitt the man who can fairly be supposed ignorant of any subject he solemnly brings before Parliament; who can even be suspected of leaguings with unprincipled contractors and designing speculators, to deceive and embarrass his country? Is it likely he would be directed in his public conduct by the information of undervaluing officers, if such presented themselves? But where is the evidence of their existing amongst our naval officers such unworthy men, such traitors to their country? And without evidence, is it honourable to insult those who are already suffering from neglect? If there are any of this description, why (in the language of these gentlemen) not name them, and hold them up to the detestation they have deserved? — Be assured, Mr. Editor, there are as good sea officers, and as honourable men, now unemployed as any that are serving; as real friends to their King and Country, and as incapable of descending to any meanness for interested ends. — In saying this, I am not to be understood as intending to disparage those in employment, they would, I am sure, concur in my remark. But some worthy impartial representatives cry, who are these respectable naval characters that wish for

inquiry respecting the Admiralty? Why don't they come forward? To this I answer; it is useless to name them: no means have yet been afforded them of giving their opinion publicly with effect?—Let the House call to their bar, and examine any number of sea officers, employed or unemployed, and I will answer with my head, no member will longer doubt the source of Mr. Pitt's information, or the singularity of Admiral Pole and Sir E. Pellew's opinion. These last mentioned officers are stated to have said in the House of Commons, that Mr. Pitt's motion was calculated to excite a groundless distrust in the Admiralty, whose system they perfectly approved. They said we have ships of the line and every description of ships, and armed vessels sufficient for our purpose. They disapproved our building ships in merchants' yards, and hiring small craft, because in both, impositions have been practised. — They said, that gun-boats ought to be resisted by ships of war, not by gun-boats, and that of the latter, we have numbers sufficient for our purpose. — They are further represented as having said the exertions used to obtain men were unparalleled. Sir E. Pellew is made to declare, that all ranks and descriptions of men in the navy have shewn more zeal and ardour in the service, than were ever manifested on any former occasion; that there was never greater satisfaction manifested on board each particular ship, nor were they ever better stored, or in better condition in every respect, than from 1801 to this time. — By what facts or arguments these officers could have supported their assertions, I cannot judge. (Sir E. Pellew's abilities I fully admit,) but I must venture to assert, both deceived the public, though I dare believe unintentionally. — Examine the best informed naval officers, and they will tell you we have not ships and vessels enough of any description for our present purpose, nor a proper succession for the protracted warfare we are likely to be engaged in; they will tell you, we have neither stores nor artificers in our dock-yards, proportioned to our wants; that our ships are, generally speaking, in bad condition and ill supplied; that they are ill manned, and their stores, particularly rope, are of bad quality; they would tell you, that the zeal, spirit, and ardour of our officers is not impaired, but that the treatment they experience from the Admiralty is revolting, and the nature of their instructions embarrassing; that unprecedented restrictions are put on their conduct, and that it is watched by encouraged informers of every description. They would tell you, if we had a fleet

of large ships on the coast of Ireland, at St. Helens, in the Downs, and in Leith Roads, of sufficient force to meet the Brest fleet, in the event of its escaping Admiral Cornwallis' vigilance, there would be no unnecessary preparation against possible and serious mischief. They will tell you, that we are deficient in small craft; that the French gun-boats, when becalmed in deep water, or when they are amongst shoals, can only be effectually resisted by similar vessels; that our armed boats are private property, and constructed for other purposes than those of war; they are consequently not always to be had when wanted, nor are they strong enough to bear the frequent firing of artillery, whilst laden with a quantity of ammunition sufficient for serious engagement with the enemy; besides this, their motion (from their lightness), is too quick to allow of their firing cannon with good effect at any material distance; and when near, they are exposed to suffer severely, from want of cover for their men, and room for a sufficient number with small arms. They will allow, that impositions have been practised from constructing ships in merchants' yards, and in hiring small vessels, yet that these impositions being now detected, may be guarded against in future; and that unless we adopt these methods to obtain each, we shall obtain neither. — As the sum of their opinion, they will assert, that whilst any means are omitted of increasing our naval force of every description, our number of seamen, and quantity of stores to the utmost possible extent, whilst in hostility with France, blame is imputable to those who preside at the Admiralty. — Much remains untouched, that might be adduced in support of Mr. Pitt's motion, and reply to the various objections it met with; but for the present, at least, I will not attempt to engross a larger share of your time. — I remain, Sir, your's faithfully,

AN OLD SEAMAN.

POWERS OF THE CONTINENT.

SIR, — Before entering on the eventful scenes before us, it will be proper to take a short view of the theatre on which they are acting: to avoid referring to single and insulated transactions, it will be necessary to take a rapid retrospect of some of the principal events that have led to the present dislocation of Europe. — Europe had been divided between the rival houses of France and Austria, for about two centuries previous to the extinction of the male line of the House of Habsburg, when Prussia arose, occasioned new connexions, new alliances,

and has contributed considerably to produce great changes in this quarter of the globe. In the early part of that period Austria predominated, but during the latter and much longer part, the power of France had been constantly on the increase, while that of Austria had comparatively been on the decline. England, and afterwards Holland, though far from steady in their political conduct, had repeatedly entered the lists in time to prevent the balance from being materially shaken. But, although the balance was not lost, France, notwithstanding civil wars, the dotage of Louis XIV., the profligacy of the regency, and the inanity of Louis XV., had successively added to her dominions, and wanted nothing but an able administration to appear more formidable than in the most shining days of Louis XIV. The only effectual opponent to so great and growing a power, would have been an union of the German empire, sufficiently strong to call forth the whole force of that great body with energy and effect. Since the peace of Westphalia, that could never fully take place. Among so many princes with jarring interests, there were always some who had foreign connexions, and even France found allies in the empire itself. Much, however, had been done with the assistance of the maritime powers to oppose the progress of France, till Prussia, in becoming an independent state, did, in fact, dismember the Germanic body, and crippled the power of the House of Austria. When it first acquired the title of kingdom, the change of name was of little consequence, as it continued under the influence of the empire; but, when the throne came to be filled by a prince, who not satisfied with the name of king, was resolved to be an independent sovereign, a fatal blow was given to the union and power of the German nation; more sensibly felt, as it happened under a female succession, that was bringing, and with some interruption, a new family to the imperial dignity. In asserting his independence, that prince unavoidably became hostile to the head of the empire, and seated on the confines of the hereditary dominions, Austria was his nearest and most dangerous enemy. But the subjects of contention were not confined to these obvious causes of dissection. The first essay in the political career of that great monarch, who drew Prussia from obscurity, was to seize upon one of the Austrian provinces. To preserve his conquest he became the ally of France; and, regardless of treaties, took the field on the first appearance of any superiority of the Austrian arms. It was pro-

bably more from a desire to regain that province, and the animosity arising from those aggressions, the more poignant to so haughty a house, as they proceeded from one whom they considered as little more than a feudatory of the empire, than from any views of profound policy, that the court of Vienna formed an alliance with France. By that treaty Austria abandoned her former friends for an old enemy, converted into a new and dangerous ally; the ancient political system of Europe was overthrown, and among all the numerous powers engaged in the war that succeeded, there was not one that had not departed from those principles which it might have been expected their political interests would have dictated, except Prussia alone, that was combatting for independence and almost existence. The court of Vienna introduced French armies into the empire; France and Russia joined in the coalition against Prussia; Sweden supported the cause of Russia; England was engaged against Austria. Freed by that treaty from any apprehension on the side of France, the cabinet of Vienna excited so vast a force against the King of Prussia, that there did not seem a possibility that so new and so small a state could resist it. How far it was consistent with sound policy, in the great minister, who at that time directed the affairs of this country, to enter into so close an alliance with that monarch, as almost to amount to a guarantee of the dominions that he then possessed, is problematical. Great Britain could have very little inducement to wish for the destruction of Prussia, but still less that it should become the rival of Austria. A prince of less powers of mind would have yielded to the storm; he braved it, and alter one of the greatest struggles that stands upon the records of history, placed Prussia, by the peace of Hubertsburg, among the considerable nations of Europe.—The alliance between Great Britain and Prussia had been virtually dissolved before the end of the war; and the peace of 1763, found the former without an ally upon the continent. The navy of Great Britain had not, at that time, arrived at the perfection which it has since attained, but it far exceeded any that then existed. The navy of Louis XIV. perished before himself; the fleets of Holland, which had so long disputed the empire of the sea, were worn out, like the nation itself, which made an expiring exertion in the war of the Austrian succession. In wars of wealth, of commerce, or of colonies, England was beyond comparison the first nation in the world; in

continental wars, where the great interests of Europe are decided, England was a powerful auxiliary, but without allies, nothing. With continental allies Great Britain had contributed largely in the war of the revolution to curb the ambition of France; in the war of the Spanish succession, to humble Louis XIV.; in the war of the Austrian succession, to preserve that succession nearly undiminished; and, in the war of 1756, with very inferior force, to save the North of Germany, and beat the French in every other part of the globe. Without allies, the American war, a war upon our own element, was disastrous. If we had had powerful allies upon the continent, it is not improbable that the French would not have entered, at least openly, into the quarrel; but their frontiers being secured by the treaty with Austria, they had paid little attention to the army after the peace of 1763; and, in concert with Spain, made every exertion to create a navy equal to cope with that of Great Britain; they did contest the empire of the sea, conquered many of our foreign possessions, and we were obliged to purchase peace by the separation of the colonies, and the loss of part of the acquisitions of the war of 1756.—From the changes that had taken place on the continent, the line of political conduct was neither so clear nor so uniform as before, but opportunities of forming alliances were not wanting, if proper use had been made of them. It was not the interest of Prussia that the empire should be farther dismembered or divided; it was a defence against foreign enemies, and even against Austria. Upon this principle Frederick the Great acted at the time of his greatest hostility against the House of Austria; he declined supporting the Court of Versailles in schemes for subverting the empire. The alliance between France and Austria was not annulled, but their interests were too discordant, and the causes of dissension too many for the connexion to be cordial; on several occasions their mutual jealousy was so great as to be little short of actual hostility; even so early as a few years after the peace of 1763, the Emperor and the King of Prussia came under an engagement to defend the neutrality of the empire, in case of a war between France and England. But, for twenty years, Great Britain seemed to be engrossed with a scheme of raising a tax upon the colonies, which would hardly have been worth collecting, shewed scarcely any other signs of political existence, had very little share in the affairs of the continent, and remained without an

ally till that fatal contest was brought to a conclusion.—The partition of Poland brought a new actor upon the stage. Russia, separated from the rest of Europe by tributary or dependent states, had before that time entered but little into the general political system of this part of the world. The war with Prussia was undertaken in the cause of the King of Poland, and the discussions of the Court of Petersburg with those of Vienna and Versailles, had almost exclusively related to Poland and Turkey; but the boundaries of the empire being then brought forward to those of some of the principal powers of the continent, Russia became immediately interested in most of the transactions of Europe. From vast extent of dominion, the achievements of Peter I., numerous conquests, great influence in the North, and the sway exercised in Poland, Russia had been regarded as a formidable power, even while viewed at her former distance; great late acquisitions, and the dazzling reign of Catherine, have, in the opinion of many, afforded uncommon importance to Russia; a train of splendid victories seems to have induced a belief, that her armies are at least equal to any on the continent, and that they have only to enter the field to repair the disasters of the neighbouring nations. From the supineness of the court of Petersburg there is reason to fear that it partakes of the delusion, but whatever may, upon trial, be the result, it is at least judging rashly. Russia is still but half emerged from barbarism; great part of her extensive kingdoms are thinly scattered with savage tribes, that add little to her strength; her new provinces are not incorporated with the old, her government is despotism, great part of her people are slaves, and the abuses of administration are enormous; her armies are almost untried against European troops, and, when they have been opposed to them, the issue has been various; at Zomdorff, although they repulsed the first attack of the Prussian troops, the battle ended in a route little inferior to that of Naiva; at Kunnersdorff, when on the point of being totally defeated, they gained the victory; at Cassleggio they at first gave way, but when supported, maintained their position; at Novi they were repulsed; in Switzerland they were cut to pieces; in Holland they miscarried. But, let it not be supposed, that I mean to detract from the real consequence of Russia; Russia is a great nation, her dominions immense, her people numerous, her acquisitions, in the last century, greater than those of all the other na-

tions of Europe together; the spirit of her government improving, and her resources many; the superiority of her armies over the Asiatic troops, with whom her principal contests have been, decided; at Novi the attack was difficult; in Switzerland they were greatly out-numbered; in Holland they were separated from the rest of the army; the assault of Prague was brilliant. Russia would have great weight in the scale; I only wish to banish the dangerous and dastardly idea, that, should other nations not fight their own battles, Russia could ever avenge the cause of Europe, or prove the last asylum of freedom or civilised society.

CAMILLUS.

March 14, 1804.

BRITISH CREDITORS.

SIR,—I have read your observations on British subjects holders of French stock, prior to, and on the commencement of the revolution, without entering into the merits or demerits of their case. I wish you would pay some little attention to that of those British merchants, who, established in France under the sanction of a treaty of commerce, had their property, consisting in merchandise and mercantile establishments only, violently taken from them; these unfortunate men, few comparatively in number, are now with their families, reduced to extreme poverty; in pleading their cause, I do not mean to comprehend manufactories conveyed from hence to France, or, indeed, any trade or establishment inconsistent with the regular traffic and advantage of our own country; but to bring forth the unrewarded merit of those, who sacrificing every other motive to their loyalty and love of England, took the earliest opportunity of flying from the yoke of Robespierre; many of whom have been obliged since the conclusion of the treaty of peace, to pay the French such debts, interest included, as formed the original amount of goods purchased in France, and afterwards taken from them by the French government at the *maximum* which was tantamount to nothing. I am the more inclined to wish the insertion of these remarks in your paper, because it is become the criterion of truth, often revealed with energy by you, six months before it strikes the comprehension of others.—I am, Sir, your most obedient servant.

MERCATOR.

March 19, 1804.

HIS MAJESTY'S ILLNESS.

SIR,—His Majesty's illness has de-

servedly been considered as a matter of considerable delicacy, and it is on that account, I presume, that no discussion on it has lately appeared in the "Register." Whether, indeed, that delicacy has not been somewhat over-rated from interested motives, both in and out of Parliament, though it may admit of a doubt, I shall not now enquire. The few observations I am about to make, and which, if you do not think them altogether unworthy of notice, I take the liberty of offering for insertion, relate to a view of the subject which is not only very important, but of which no person, however scrupulous, can be expected to disapprove.—It is now some time since his Majesty's confidential servants, not indeed, till they had been strongly and repeatedly pressed, declared "that there did not exist any necessary suspension of the personal exercise of the royal authority." Perhaps, had this declaration been made spontaneously, and had the accounts of the physicians been expressed in clearer terms, they might have contributed more to tranquillise the public mind, and might have prevented that air of mystery, and ambiguity, which it would be in vain to deny, has hung over the whole transaction. Still, however, I should be very unwilling upon any ground short of positive and incontestible evidence, to suppose that the ministers had practised, and the physicians connived at any fraud upon the public in an affair of such magnitude; and indeed, it is wholly foreign to the purpose of my argument, to contest the authority of either. Admitting then, as I am ready to admit, that his Majesty is sufficiently recovered to be able to go through the *actual* business of the state, without danger or material inconvenience; does it follow, or will it even be pretended, that he would be equal to that extraordinary load of affairs, which any sudden and violent change of circumstances would bring upon him?—Ministers have long since assured us, and what is far more to the purpose, many wise and well informed men believe, that a formidable invasion may be at the distance of only a few weeks, perhaps, a few days. When we recollect the sensation produced in this country, by the predatory incursion of a handful of convicts in Wales, what may we not look to as the effect of a serious and extensive attack, upon every class of persons; not excepting from the general "panic" the Cabinet and its hero, the magnanimous Col. Tierney. The duties of the Sovereign, increased beyond conception, both in number and urgency, must then be performed; not in that manner, at those hours, and in such portions as

may be most compatible with his mental and bodily repose; but at the most inconvenient moment, abruptly, amidst danger, difficulty, and confusion. Will the state of discipline to which (supposing the event not to happen before) "three weeks permanent pay and duty" are to bring the volunteers, secure us from the chance of defeat? And in that case what must be the feelings of our venerable Monarch, whose kingdom during one of the longest reigns our history records, has never till this moment, with any prospect of success, been even threatened with invasion? What would be his agitation at hearing for the first time, at once, of the destruction of an army, and the waste of a province? I pass over what would not be the least painful, and embarrassing circumstance of his situation, the total failure of all national confidence in his servants; which, if it has not taken place already, would infallibly be occasioned by the presence of the crisis. Surely, it is neither indecent, nor absurd, but perfectly consistent both with loyalty and sound sense, to suppose, that were his ministers for the sake of protracting the duration of their own power, to risque exposing him to these accumulated labours, and poignant anxieties; the consequence might probably be a return of his indisposition. The situation of things would not then allow us to remain a single day, much less whole weeks, in perfect uncertainty, whether we had, or had not, an executive government. The King must either be constantly prepared to meet his council; or, if unhappily prevented, for however short a time, from executing the indispensable functions of his supreme office, some power must be instantly created to supply the deficiency. In some shape or another we should have recourse to a *regency*. Now, if it we must observe, that notwithstanding, all the discussions which took place on the subject, at a former period, neither the persons of whom it would be composed, or the principles on which their authority would be established and limited, are sufficiently known to this hour. The whole affair, as a "*res integra*" must be brought before Parliament; and, an arduous task it would have to perform, even under the most favourable circumstances; and one which more than any other would require a full attendance and mature deliberation. But, to what number would Parliament assemble, were a powerful army of the enemy already landed? Of whom would it consist? Of a few infirm, a few superannuated, a few placemen, who would sit trembling on the benches of St. Stephen's, whilst the remain-

der were gone to fight the battles of their country. Fit persons truly, to decide upon a great legislative provision, to erect another land-mark of the constitution, to establish a precedent for future ages! Yet, they must decide, and we must be guided by their decision, in the disposal of the supreme authority; otherwise, the kingdom must fall into a total anarchy; or, what is nearly the same thing, we must continue to trust to the responsibility of Henry and Hiley.—I know not, that in the case which I have now stated, there is either any thing impossible, or so remote in point of probability, as to justify us in remaining unprovided against its occurrence. Why, then, instead of prattling about a nugatory bill, by which, Mr. Addington wants to make the volunteers a little less, and Mr. Pitt a little more like soldiers, are not Parliament seriously occupied in preparing some plan, by which we might be guided in this most important particular, should any severe relapse deprive us of the protection of our Sovereign, in the hour of danger and trial? Would there be any want of "delicacy" in such a proceeding, any thing that could wound the personal feelings of our beloved Monarch? On the contrary, I am convinced, that there could not be a more groundless misrepresentation of his character, than to suppose, that from him it would meet with any obstacle. He is not like those tyrants, of whom we are told, that they were desirous of enhancing the splendour and tranquillity of their own time, by laying the foundation of future misery, and discord. No; his wishes are, that during his absence, as well as during his presence, his people should be happy; and, his paternal care extends to those moments, when he himself is unable to watch over their welfare.—It is indeed, hard to conceive, what has prevented us from having recourse to so natural, and so necessary a measure; and one, which the late serious warnings, must have pressed so forcibly upon the mind of every thinking man. Nothing, indeed, could account for the omission, but that torpid indifference to all but the concerns of the moment, that wretched short-sightedness, that total absence of such wise and manly counsels, as would teach us to encounter an immediate difficulty, in order to avoid an approaching disaster—those worst symptoms of the worst times, which are in so eminent a degree, characteristic of the present days, and the present government; and which, unless we soon have recourse to other means, and other principles, must bring on, if not our utter destruction, at least our final degradation from the place, to which our an-

cestors, who were neither "good sort of men," "candid ministers," or "safe politicians," had raised us among the nations of Europe.—W. W.

CONSPIRACY AT PARIS.

Extracts from the Moniteur of the 7th and 9th of March, 1804, relative to the Conspiracy.

MARCH 7.—On this day last year Europe was at peace. A year will have elapsed tomorrow since the King of England, dishonouring a reign of forty years by the grossest —, summoned his nation to arms, "because," said he, in the face of Europe, "the ports of France and Holland were filled with formidable armaments, which threatened the constitution, independence, and religion of the English people."—This fallacious message renewed the war.—The ministers of the King of England proposed a new message to celebrate that anniversary.—They relied upon announcing to Parliament, that they had cowardly caused the First Consul to be assassinated. But He who disposes of the life of man and the destinies of empires, had ordained it otherwise. The French government is stronger, and new energy has animated and united the citizens, and has taught the wicked and the conspirators that the people, the whole people assemble, press round the chief of the state.—The First Consul, superior to all events, tranquil in the midst of these vain conspiracies, wholly devoted to the labours of government and the war, is more than ever in a situation to accomplish the order of destiny, and to avenge the right of nations, the right of people, so often violated; whilst the King of England, visited with illness on the very day marked for the assassination of the First Consul.

The sentence concludes with some of the grossest and falsest expressions, relative to the Royal Family, and the English nation.

At sight of these signal proofs of the existence of a divine and just Providence, we recollect the sublimest pictures of the Prophecies of Isaiah—we say with Daniel—**MANE-TEKEL-PHARES.**

MARCH 9.—At seven this evening, *Georges*, chief of the band of brigands, and *Leridan*, the younger, were arrested on the Place de l'Odéon. *Georges* was in a cabriolet; he killed with a pistol-ball the peace-officer who stopped his horse, and wounded the officer who had attempted to seize him. He was armed with a poignard of the same English fabric as the one found upon *Pichegru*. He had about him very considerable sums in

bills of the Bank of France, and in bills of exchange drawn from London. Every thing induces a presumption that he was on the point of attempting to escape, and of profiting by the darkness of the night to pass the walls.—He declared, without hesitation, that he had been at Paris for several months, that he had come from England, and that his mission was to assassinate the First Consul.—*Leridan* the younger, who was not in the list of brigands, is one of the four individuals whom the police knew to be at Paris without knowing their names. He is known by the robberies he committed for several months in the Morbihan.

Report of the Grand Judge, enumerating the Brigands armed by the English Government to attack the Life of the First Consul.

First landing, on the 21st August, at the foot of the Cliff de Beville, from an English cutter, Capt. *Wright*.—1. *Georges*, the ex-chief of the brigands.—2. *Villeneuve*.—3. *Lahay St. Hilaire*.—4. *Qurrel*, called *Courson*, arrested on the 11th October, in the rue de Rochechouart.—5. *La Bothe*, called *Kercher*, his real name is *Breche*.—6. *Picot*, called *Le Petit*, arrested the 7th February, rue de Bacq.—7. *Froche*, the son, arrested at Eu on the 1st February.—8. *Jean Marie*, under the name of *Lemaire*, confidential clerk of *Georges*.

Second landing at the same place, in the beginning of December, from the same English vessel.—1. *Jean Marie*, the same as before.—2. *Coster*, called *St. Victor*, one of the accomplices of the 3d Nivôse, arrested on the 8th February in the rue Xaintonge.—3. *Armand Polignac*, eldest son of the Duke de *Polignac*, arrested in the rue St. Denis, 28th February.—4. *Jean Louis*.—5. *Lemerrier*.—6. *Tamerlan*.—7. *Lelan*, called *Brutus*.—8. *Pierre Jean*.

Third landing, on the 16th January, from the same.—1. *Jean Marie*.—The same as in the preceding debarkation; constantly returning to England to bring the other brigands.—2. *Charles Pichegru*, ex-general, arrested at Paris the 27th Feb.—3. *Lajolais*, ex-general, under the name of *Frederick*, and *Denville*, sent to London in November last by *Moreau* to *Pichegru*: upon his return to Paris he was the go-between between *Moreau* and *Pichegru*. Arrested at Paris 14th Feb.—4. *Ruziton*, known among the brigands by the name of *Gros Major*, arrested at Paris the 5th March.—5. *Jules Polignac*, second son of the Duke of that name, arrested on the 3d of March.—6. *Rochelle*, called *Rochette Brun*, and *Richemont*, arrested on the 5th of March.—7. *Armand Gaillard*, of Rouen.



Accomplices who did not land at Beville; some have been in France for several years, others landed in Brittany, and were to recruit brigands there, to send them to Paris:

- 1. *Guillard Rioul*, of Rouen, known by the name of *St. Vincent*, *Houzel*, and *Ducak*.
- 2. *Desh de Grissolles*, concealed at Paris, where he waited for *Georges*. He went in a coach, on the 1st of September, to St. Leu, and brought him to Paris: arrested on the 10th of November, on the Boulevard Italien.
- 3. *Bouzet de Lozier*, one of the principal confidants of *Georges*, charged to procure him lodgings at Paris, and the environs.—4. *Abraham Augustus Charles D'Hosier*.—5. *Ruben Lagmoudiere*, who came from Rennes to join the assassins; arrested on Feb. 7, in one of the houses of the Band Rue de Bagy.—6. *Barbon Midabry*, called *Barco*.—7. *Roger*, called *Loiseau*, came from England by way of Brittany, went to Paris with a forged passport from Rennes; arrested at the Saintonge, on the 8th of February.—8. *Herve*, shoemaker at Rennes.—9. *Mertlie*, of St. Paers, a subaltern assassin, arrested on the 7th February.—10. *Paul Ducorps*, commissary of the brigands, arrested at Abbeville on the 28th January.—11. *Louis Ducorps*, his son, an Ex-Chouan, and robber of diligences.—12. The Ex-Marq. of *Reviere*, the confidant of the Count *D'Artois*. The portrait of that Prince was found upon him with this inscription—"Given by the Count *D'Artois* to his faithful Aide-de-Camp *de Reviere*, for the perilous journeys taken in his service." Arrested March 3.—13. *Eduard Gallieire*, *Le Palge*, sent from London into Brittany, for the purpose of forming a rallying point of insurrection, and to recruit 40 assassins to be sent to Paris.—14. *Even*, a notary, and Ex-Chouan.—15. *Duverger*.—16. *Guillemot*, chief of the horde in the Morbihan.—17. *Gambert*, the same.—18. *Jaques Evano*, surnamed the *Great James* and *Hector*.—19. *Le Chevalier De Voey*.—20. *Troussier*.—21. *Roku*, a Chouan.—22. *Gometz*, principal confidant of *Georges*.—23. *Jaques Audrian*, the same.—24. *Guerin Brulard*, formerly a Major-General.—25. *Jaques Duchemin*.—26. *Saint Hubert*.—27. *Colliton*.—28. *Jean*.—29. *Moreau*, General, had an understanding with the enemies of the state; communicated with *Pichegru*; sent to London, even since the war, to confer with the enemy, through the medium of *Pichegru*; held communications with *Georges*, through *Presniere* and *Villeneuve*; since *Pichegru*'s arrival at Paris, he saw him several times. Once *Pichegru* was in company with *Georges*. *Moreau* communicated with *Georges* through *Roland*, *Lajollais*, and *Fresniere*. Arrested on the 14th February.—20. *Fresniere*, private

secretary to *Moreau*, communicated with *Georges*, through *Villeneuve*, principal confidant to *Pichegru*, and brought *Pichegru* several times to *Moreau*. He is fled.—31. *Laberie*, general instigator and adviser of *Moreau*. He is fled.—32. *Badouville*, formerly Aide-de-Camp to *Pichegru*, spy upon our armies, correspondent of *Wickham*, agent of *Pichegru*, arrived at Paris as soon as he knew *Pichegru* was there. Arrested on the 3d of March.—33. The Abbe *Davill*, charged with tying the first knot of all this plot, arrested on the 6th of December last year, as he was going to London to *Pichegru*. Brought to the Temple on the 13th December.—34. *Victor Couchery*.—35. *Roland*, arrested on the 14th February.—36. *Freche*, sen. arrested on the 3d February.—37. *Monnet*, arrested on the 5th February.—Signed, The Grand Judge,—REGNIER.

INTELLIGENCE.

FOREIGN.—Representations have been made by the different foreign ministers at Constantinople against the conduct of Ali Pasha, the Turkish Governor at Alexandria, whose soldiers have been guilty of great enormities towards the European Consuls and inhabitants at that place.—The members of the order of St. John of Jerusalem, who had been, for a considerable time past, residing at Messina, have lately embarked, with the archives and treasury of the order for Catania, where the Grand Master now is.—The King of Sardinia remains at Rome; and one of the brothers of the First Consul is also a visitor at that city, where he has been for some time, incognito.—The French Envoy at the Court of Lisbon recently announced to the republican merchants and traders there, that all apprehensions of a rupture with Portugal had entirely subsided, in consequence of a treaty of neutrality, which was concluded on the 19th of December, between that power and the French Republic.—Nothing further of importance has transpired relative to the conspiracy against the First Consul, except the arrestation of *Georges* and about thirty of his followers, who are reported to have been apprehended at Paris. Madame *Moreau* continues at large, and, since the imprisonment of her husband, has been more than ever noticed by the Parisians, great numbers of whom, it is said, visit her daily. *Bonaparte*, confident of the present stability of his authority, has left the capital, and, together with his staff, is now at Boulogne.—“We have,” says the *Moniteur* of the 6th instant, “received very detailed accounts from the Isle of France. The dispatches of

Capt.-Gen. Decaen and of Vice Adm. Linois, contain details the most satisfactory. The whole squadron anchored before Pondicherry, with the exception of the transport, the *Cote d'Or*, which remained behind. Twenty-four hours after the arrival of the squadron, it was joined by the brig sent from Brest, carrying the news of the message of the King of England. Five English ships of the line and three frigates had anchored near the French squadron. At midnight, Vice-Adm. Linois, leaving at Pondicherry fifty men and the women who had been debarked, cut his cables, put to sea, and sailed for the Isle of France, where his squadron anchored on the 25th day, and in good condition.—The transport, the *Cote d'Or*, was not long in arriving in the Indian Seas. An English frigate fired at her several shots, which did her no damage, and conducted her to the enemy's squadron before Pondicherry. The Gov. Gen. of India who had not yet received any news from Europe, gave orders to release her, and the Fr. Com. at Pondicherry sent her to the Isle of France, where she joined Vice-Adm. Linois.—The 24th of Sept. the corvette, the *Beceau*, anchored at the Isle of France; she brought news of the declaration of war, of which the English were still ignorant.—The six French frigates, the corvettes, the other light vessels of the squadron, and eight cruizers armed in the country, put to sea to cruize, hoping to revenge our commerce for the numerous piracies of the English.—Anarchy had ceased in the colony. Gen. Decaen had assumed the character of Capt.-Gen. Leger, that of Prefect; and Gen. Magalon, that of Com. of the Isle of Reunion. The militia was in the same state as in the preceding year, and the colony had three thousand men, good troops, newly arrived from Europe.—A considerable Dutch squadron was at Batavia, and four vessels of the same nation were at anchor at the Isle of France.—The battle lost by the English against the Mahrattas was officially confirmed, as well as the disasters which the English troops had experienced at the Isle of Ceylon."

DOMESTIC.—According to the daily reports of four of his Majesty's Physicians, the King is gradually recovering. They stated on the 15th inst. that "his Majesty still advances in recovery;" on the 16th, that "his Majesty continues to recover;" on the 17th, that "his Majesty is considerably recovered;" on the 18th, that "his Majesty continues to recover;" on the 19th, that "his Majesty is considerably better, and is far advanced in recovery;" and on the 20th, that "his Majesty continues to recover."

(To be continued.)

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CONSPIRACY AT PARIS.—In a former page of this sheet, will be found the names of the persons, who have been arrested at Paris, amongst whom every one entertaining sentiments of loyalty must be sorry to see those of several men highly distinguished for their inviolable attachment to their lawful sovereign and to the monarchy of France. It will be perceived, that the *Moniteur*, clearly and directly repeats the charge against our government, of having employed and paid the conspirators, for the purpose of assassinating the First Consul; and, this nation repeats its call upon ministers to clear it and themselves from the infamous imputation. It is said, that, upon some of the parties arrested, bills of exchange, drawn in England, to an immense amount, have been found. If this be true, the circumstance, though by no means decisive as to the fact of intended assassination, will most certainly be regarded as a proof of the participation of the British government in the conspiracy; and, unless ministers come forward with a satisfactory explanation, the intention to assassinate will, in the opinions of mankind in general, for ever make part of the charge against us. The assassination of Buonaparte having, too, but a few weeks before the discovery of the conspiracy, been predicted in a hand-bill posted all over London; the accomplishment of that deed having been rumoured upon the Exchange, and having even caused a rise in the price of the funds (detestable traffic!); Mr. Peltier having been, before the rupture, prosecuted for, and convicted of, making publications calculated to excite the people of France to assassinate the Consul, and his having, after the rupture, been suffered to remain unarraigned for judgment: these circumstances, though they might have, and though the latter, doubtless, had, no connexion whatever with the conspiracy, or with the intention of ministers, or any other persons, in this country, will assuredly have great weight in fixing the opinions of the world, as to this transaction, unless an official explanation takes place; and, therefore, such an explanation ought to take place, without a day's delay. How far this government would be justified in endeavouring to excite insurrection against Buonaparte after having solemnly recognized the legality of his power, may be a matter of doubt; and, on that point, men may, perhaps, be all on two hold different opinions; but, with respect to assassination, the unanimous voice of mankind has pronounced. Let it not be said, that "silent contempt" is the only proper answer to the

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charge: for, the world will not fail to compare this doctrine with the practice of his Majesty's ministers, at the breaking out of the war; when, not only were the publications of the *Moniteur* regarded as worthy of serious and official notice and animadversion, but, it will be well and long recollected, that some of those publications formed the principal grounds of the war; and, that one of them was a publication wherein this government was said to have caressed assassins for having attempted the life of Buonaparte! Let the wise and "well-meaning" ministry remember this; and, let them say, how it happens, that a charge, which was made a ground of war, ought now to be treated with "silent contempt."

SIERRA LEONE.—A report has been made to the Parliament relative to the situation and future prospects of this colony, if, indeed, a miserable assemblage of forty Europeans and six or seven hundred maroons and other negroes be worthy of the name of colony. From this report, it appears, that civilization has made but little progress, and that wars with the natives has been almost incessant; that none, no not one, of the objects of the projectors has been accomplished, and that the civil and military expenses of the colony cannot be defrayed by a less sum than 16,000*l.* a year, 10,000*l.* of which, exclusive of occasional grants and naval expenses, must come out of the public treasure. The Committee are anxious that the experiment should not yet be abandoned, but they conclude their report by recommending, that the civil and military government of the colony should be transferred to the crown. The words are as follows: "Upon the whole, your Committee, from a full consideration of the state of the Company's funds, of the necessity of *supplying their deficiency*, of the uncertainty of attending the constant renewal of the Parliamentary grants which may hereafter be found necessary, and of the interest of the British government in the colony, as connected with the maintenance of the Maroons and Nova Scotians, who are its inhabitants, have been led to conclude, that the objects for which the colony was instituted, may be more easily and effectually attained by *transferring the civil and military authority to the crown*; for which purpose it may be reasonably expected, that a *partial surrender of the rights of the Company may be obtained* from the proprietors, provided security is given for the prosecution of the objects originally proposed!!!!" Surely, this hardly requires a comment? The names of

the gentlemen composing this Committee do not appear in the report. It really would be curious to know who framed and who presented this report. This philanthropic project having been found to yield *no profit*; but having, on the contrary, been found to be attended with considerable loss to the proprietors, those philanthropic gentlemen are now willing to make a surrender of *part* of their rights, and of the civil and military authority, that is to say, of *all* the rights of the dear negroes, to the government! Generous, kind, benevolent creatures! What! they are perfectly ready to make the government, that is to say, the people of England, Ireland, and Scotland, a present of an expense of 16,000*l.* a year! And, will the Parliament ever submit to this? Will they, for a moment, listen to a proposition of this sort?—Another opportunity will be found to endeavour to arrest the progress of this mischievous measure, by developing the whole of its absurdity and its consequence: at present there are to be noticed two or three little points, in which a most useful lesson appears to be afforded us by the colony of Leone, which seems, in some respects to be a miniature picture of the mother country. The Leoneans, as well as the English, have "a *paper-money*" and "a *Volunteer force*;" the former has occasioned "material inconvenience," and the latter enormous expense.—The *trade* of the Leone is, too, very well worth attention. The Leoneans are a people who export nothing; they literally swallow all the produce of their own "fertile" soil, and a considerable quantity of butter, pork, and beef, raised out of the soil of England and Ireland, and, for the want of which many a poor Englishman and Irishman goes supperless to bed: yes, many an one of them lives upon dry bread, while he is raising the meat and the butter, which go to feed these lazy and profligate negroes. Here I shall be stopped and reminded, that so long as the English labourer receives what he earns, it is nothing to him whither the produce of his labour is sent, or who devours it. Push this argument to the extreme, and you will find, that it leaves the labourer without the right of complaining, though he were to be deprived of food altogether. But, without having recourse to that mode of illustration, let us see how this exportation to the Leoneans operates upon the mother country. Talk to a merchant, or a great manufacturer, and he will tell you, that the colony of Leone has one good effect, at any rate, and that is, the taking off of ten thousand pounds worth of merchandize and manufactures annually.

There he stops, looking not an inch beyond his own gains. But whence comes the money to pay for these goods? From the Parliament: that is to say, from the pockets of those who pay taxes: that is to say, out of the rents, and other incomes; and that is to say, finally, out of the labour, bodily or mental, of the people of this kingdom. It will, perhaps, be said, that these 10,000l. flow back again to the people; yes, they go back again to such persons as are able to *earn them again*; of that there is no doubt; but, as we receive nothing at all from Leone, and as we send ten thousand pounds worth of our goods to Leone, and as these goods are paid for out of the taxes, it will require a person even more able, in the art of confusing and puzzling and confounding, than either Mr. Chalmers or George Rose, to prevent a man of common sense from clearly perceiving, that it is from the labour of the people of this country, that the lazy Leoneans draw the means of their subsistence, and that the wild and useless project is supported. — These remarks suggest the propriety of submitting to Lord King, whether our trade with Leone does not furnish a practical solution of the question of a *balance of trade*, a question on which his Lordship, with that modesty which characterizes every part of his valuable work, appears to entertain some doubt. Indeed, he seems to lean towards the opponents of Hume and Smith, and to rely upon the Custom-house books as a criterion of this balance. Now, if those books are examined, with regard to the trade with Leone, it will be found, perhaps, that we export thither to the amount of 12 or 14,000l. annually; and, on the other side, it will certainly be found, that we import thence nothing at all: but, shall we, therefore, conclude, that we carry on a trade with Leone which leaves us a *balance or profit*, of twelve or fourteen thousand pounds? This is the question which is, with great respect, submitted to his lordship.

JAMAICA. — In the preceding sheet, p. 408, some observations were made respecting the disputes, which agitated the island of Jamaica, and particular stress was laid on the pretensions of the merchants and planters relative to the navigation between the West India colonies and the United States of America. Upon this subject; which is of vast importance, much useful information is to be acquired from a pamphlet, written by Lord Sheffield, and just published, entitled, “*Structures on the necessity of inviolably maintaining the navigation and colonial system of Great Britain*,” which pamphlet should be read by every gentleman,

who has a desire to be well-informed, and to imbibe sound principles, relative to the system of which it treats; and, at a time when the ministers have involved the mother-country in a dispute with our principal West-India colony, at a time when the colonists are preferring claims to free trade with America, and when America is, probably, urging corresponding claims, at such a time, and when, too, we are in the hands of a set of men whose maxim is, to yield every thing but their places and emoluments; at such a time, it becomes every one having public influence, to inquire, before it is too late, how that influence ought, as to the subject in question, to be exerted.

NAVAL INQUIRY. — The debate, which took place, upon this subject, in the House of Commons, on the 15th instant, turned principally upon two points; viz. the abolition of abuses, and the constructing of gun-boats. Of the two correspondents, whose letters will be found in a former part of this sheet, one appears to be the partisan of Lord St. Vincent, and the other of Mr. Pitt: they both write like partisans, and must be listened to with caution; yet their letters are worthy of attention. — As to abuses in the inferior departments, those abuses of contractors, or others, which Lord St. Vincent is, by his friends, said to have corrected, it would be very difficult to show that they have any connexion whatever with the question, whether that noble lord has, or has not, done his duty as first lord of the Admiralty. That the cry of “contractor” should have been raised; that any motion of Mr. Pitt’s, and particularly a motion for papers, should have been stigmatized as “smelling of a contract,” would have been most astonishing, had it proceeded from any other quarter than that which it did proceed from, Messrs. Tierney and Sheridan. In order to ascertain the true character of this accusation, which would brand with the mark of disappointed contractor or jobber, every one who disapproves of the conduct of the Admiralty, let us revert to the origin of the Naval-Abuse Bill, that bill on the framing and the execution of which so much praise of Lord St. Vincent has been founded. The bill was introduced with the express declaration, on the part of ministers, that it had in contemplation nothing more than what it was the intention of the late ministry to do; and, it was truly said, that Lord Spencer had digested a plan for correcting the abuses complained of, but that it would have been unwise to attempt the execution of that plan, or of any other of the same nature, during the war. The New Opposition were, by the *Near Observer*, ac-

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case of having opposed this measure for cor-
recting abuses. If they had opposed, as being
too harsh, a bill which the Lord Chancellor,
even after all its modifications, described as
"a most consummate act of tyranny," there
certainly would not have been much room
for the present ministers to blame their con-
duct. But, the fact is otherwise; for, during
the whole progress of the bill, not one word
was uttered in opposition to it, either by
Lord Spencer, Lord Grenville, or Mr. Wind-
ham. Lord Folkestone objected to the bill
altogether; but, upon what occasion, and on
what account was this objection made? The
Doctor had stated, that such a bill was in-
tended to be introduced by the late first lord
of the Admiralty, but that, the introduction
was delayed till a time of peace, because,
during a war, it would have thrown the
Dock-yards, and, indeed, the whole naval
system, into confusion, and would, possibly,
have produced a state nearly resembling that
of dissolution. "Well, then," said his lord-
ship, "if this would have been the effect of
the execution of such a plan, I am against
this bill altogether; for, unless I am very
much deceived, we shall be at war again
before its execution can scarcely have be-
gun; and, it is at the breaking out of a
war, above all other times, that harmony
in every department of the navy is neces-
sary to the welfare of the state." Was
this factious opposition? Was this to en-
courage and shelter abuses? Or, was it the
expression of an objection founded in reason
and verified now by experience? To this ob-
jection the Doctor answered, with that
charming condescending smile which accom-
panies all his wise sayings, "that he did not
know what should induce the noble lord
to apprehend a speedy rupture of the
peace, but that, at any rate, he was con-
fident the House did not participate in the
apprehensions." The Doctor was right:
the House reposed quietly on his pillow of
peace; it confided in him, and it was, as is
usual in such cases, grossly deceived.—That
there are, amongst those who complain of
Lord St. Vincent, disappointed contractors
and the adherents of disappointed contrac-
tors, nobody denies, nobody doubts; but, is
it fair to presume, that every one who says
that the Admiralty has been remiss, is of this
description? And, does the correspondent
T. H. really think, that the Editor of this
work is a likely person to give publi-
city to the clamours of such people?
No; no one will believe, that the man,
who has, on every occasion, shown his ab-
horrence of jobbers and of jobbing, who
reprobates every measure by which the public

revenue is rendered the means of raising low
persons, all at once, to a state of opulence
that enables them to trample under-foot the
minor aristocracy and the church; and, in
many cases, to rise over the nobility even of the
first class: no one will believe that that man
is a favourer of speculators and over-swollen
contractors. A contractor may, however,
be a very honest man, and may be employed
with great advantage to the public; so that,
there appears no reason at all for reviling a
man merely because he is a contractor, any
more than because he is a commissary or a
quarter-master-general. And, as to the cor-
recting of abuses, there is moderation to be
used in that also. Where is there a concern,
or a business, even a single household, or
family of servants, where abuses do not ex-
ist? Yet, wise men are, according to the
nature of the case, always cautious, in a
greater or less degree, in proceeding to the
correction of such abuses. Like brother
Martin, they advance slowly in their work,
picking out thread by thread; and the fault
which such persons find in Lord St. Vincent,
is, not that he *has* corrected abuses, but that,
in attempting to do it, he has, like the other
reforming brother of the celebrated tale, not
picked out the tags and tannouring, but has,
by his furious proceedings, ripped, rent, and
materially injured the garment itself.—Be-
sides, when Lord St. Vincent and his friends
boast of their zeal in correcting and prevent-
ing abuses; when they again boast of the
saving which the public experience from
such efforts, let them recollect Martinico.
Let them recollect, that, on account of the
seizures of American ships made in the har-
bour of St. Pierre, the people of this country
have paid, first 75,000*l.* and afterwards more
than 300,000*l.* The first of these sums was
appropriated exclusively to that purpose; the
second in great part; and, the whole expense,
which will, in the end, amount to about
500,000*l.* was occasioned by his seizures at
that island, because it was that act which
drove the Americans almost to declare war,
and which at last produced the concessions
on our part, concessions which have already
done unto England ten thousand times as
much harm as ever Lord St. Vincent did
it good. The writer of this remembers well
the effect which that seizure produced in
America; he heard the loud and deep curses
which it brought upon his country; his pen
was long, zealously, and not altogether in-
effectually, employed to assuage the resent-
ment excited against England by that transac-
tion; and, when the recollection of it was,
in the minds of our friends in America, in
some measure effaced by the brilliant achieve-

ment that gave rise to the title of St. Vincent, he was amongst the foremost in extolling that achievement; he, therefore, cannot very patiently bear himself charged with decrying Lord St. Vincent, merely because Lord St. Vincent is the enemy of speculators. On account of the proceedings at Martinico, also, an inquiry was moved for in the House of Commons; and, though Mr. Sheridan now declares, that this is the first time in his life that he has opposed inquiry, the fact is, that he then opposed inquiry, though, upon every other point, he was in opposition to the ministers. — Mr. Pitt's case certainly was not made out. He took that sort of middle course, which ought not to succeed, and which did not succeed. The chief object of his complaint was a want of gun-boats, or gun-brigs, a subject on which he was not a competent judge, but which seems to have entered his mind in company with that of the volunteer system, and which, therefore, he could not forbear to dwell upon. That he was foully treated by the ministers, and was most grossly misrepresented in the reported speeches of Messrs. Tierney and Sheridan is certain; but, if these circumstances make him perceive the injustice of treating others in the same way, they may prove no injury either to his own reputation or to the deliberations of Parliament.

VOLUNTEER SYSTEM. — The report of the bill to consolidate all the laws previously passed relative to this system, was brought up, in the House of Commons, on Monday, the 19th instant. The Opposition contended that the bill contained so many imperfections, that it ought to be re-committed; the Ministers were for amending the bill in the House without a re-commitment; Mr. Pitt was, as usual, half on one side and half on the other; he spoke for the Opposition and voted with the Treasury, and, as his vote was worth more than his speech, the re-commitment was rejected by a majority of 173 to 56. — So imperfect was the bill found to be, however, that, on the 20th, no less than eight new clauses, some of them of great importance, were brought up, and adopted, in addition to which a number of alterations were made in the clauses, which had already been inserted, and which had been voted for by the Ministers themselves. — On the 22d the bill was read a third time; but upon the debate which then took place, and upon the several provisions in the bill, there is not now time to remark. It may suffice, for the present, to observe, that if some of these provisions are suffered to pass unaltered by the House of Lords, the

country, from one end to the other, will be plunged into discontent and disorder.

DOLLARS. — This sort of metallic money, to use a phrase of Robespierre, is, it seems, to assume a new guise. An ingenious person of Birmingham has, we are told, invented a means of effacing the Spanish impressions, and of replacing them by the *King's Head*, on one side of the dollar, and by the *Arms of the Bank*, on the other side. What arms the Bank may have; or how it became entitled to any arms at all; or whether arms ought to be held in esteem after having been so bestowed; are questions, which, if we had more leisure, it would, perhaps, be worth while to discuss. At present we must content ourselves with just making a remark or two on the effect of giving this new character to "metallic money". The difference between bank notes and assignats, or Congress money, or any such like trash, consists in this, that the former is issued upon the responsibility of a private company, against whom the public has recourse by means of the aid of government, whose business it is to see that the bank makes good its engagements; whereas, assignats and Congress money emanated from the respective governments themselves, and, of course, the public had no means of redress against the issuer, in case of a failure to make good the engagement. Mr. Pitt, in introducing the bank restriction law, made the government, in some sort a partner with the bank company, of which partnership the new-stamped dollars, with the King's head upon one side and the arms of the bank upon the other, will be the visible sign. — There is, it is said, to be, on one side, the words, "BANK DOLLAR: TAKEN FOR FIVE SHILLINGS." It will also be a token of depreciation. These dollars will soon be very scarce; for the paper will depreciate quite fast enough to make a dollar equal in value to five and sixpence worth of it by the next month of March, if the war continues, especially if the Doctor remains minister. They will, however, be hoarded up, they will serve, in after years, as a kind of medal to enumerate this eventful epoch; and, when we show them to our sons, who are now in the cradle, we shall, it is to be hoped, find some little difficulty in making them comprehend the meaning of many terms, which are now some of the most familiar in our financial vocabulary.

FINANCE. — On the 21st instant, a conversation took place, upon this subject, in the House of Commons, between Lord Falkeston, Mr. Vansittart, and the Doctor.

The Doctor, in a committee of supply, had proposed to the House to vote what he called the surplus of the ways and means of the last year, exhibiting, at the same time, an account, showing whence the said surplus was derived, and calculated to make the public believe, that it arose from economy in the naval department. Lord Folkestone observed, that the account was fallacious, because, in the produce of the war taxes up to the end of last year was stated at 4,500,000l. whereas, in fact, those taxes had, up to that time, produced no more than 1,800,000 and some odd pounds; and, because, though no account of the surplus of the consolidated fund for the last year had yet been rendered it was probable that it fell short of the 6,500,000l. at which it was taken in the account.—As to the first point it was answered, that the produce of the war taxes was not estimated up to the close of the year ending with December, but up to the close of the year ending in April!!!!!! Never, surely, was there a subterfuge like this! Never, since men learned to put words into sentences! The war taxes were estimated in the Doctor's budget of the 13th of June last, and these were his words, "The committee, however, must be aware, that, though Parliament may determine to raise 12,500,000l. of war-taxes within the year, yet a very considerable portion of this sum cannot be raised within the present year. I will, therefore, only calculate upon the sum of 4,500,000l. to be produced by the war-taxes in this year." Now, what was meant by the present year, and "this year," if not the year in which he was speaking; the year 1803? Take, too, the internal evidence. The whole year's taxes were to produce 6,500,000l. and, making an allowance for deficiency in the first quarters, is it likely that he should reckon upon only 4,500,000l. for three quarters of that year? The supposition has absurdity written upon the face of it. The fact is, that they had recourse to a barefaced shuffle. All the accounts made up to the end of the year. The account, to which Lord Folkestone referred; the account on which the Doctor's motion was grounded, is entitled an account grants "for the service of the year 1803;" and the present year has no more to do with than the last year had.—The second point, the surplus of the consolidated fund, had no hole to creep out of. They were forced to confess, that it had fallen short of their expectations by the sum of 900,000l. My readers will recollect, that this is a

point upon which I have been at issue with the Doctor, ever since December, 1802, on the 10th day of which month he estimated the surplus of the consolidated fund for 1803, at 7,845,000l. but, by way of superabundant caution, limited his confident expectation to 6,500,000l. according to the statement of his speech, printed in a pamphlet from his own manuscript, p. 20. which was, I am credibly informed, transmitted, like George Rose's famous fallacious pamphlet of 1799, to all our ministers and Consuls in foreign countries. This estimate I disputed. My readers will find in the third volume of this work, four letters addressed to the Doctor; see pages 513, 545, 577, and 609. At the close of the 4th letter, p. 614, I express myself thus: "To this point, Sir, I wish to hold you. You have asserted in the face of the House of Commons, that the surplus of the consolidated fund will, during the present year and upon the present taxes, amount to 6,500,000l. at least; I assert, that, if your account of last year be not false, the said surplus will amount to only 4,974,654l. or thereabouts. Here we are at issue. Time only can decide between us; but in the interim, I hope the parliament and the people will perceive, that the grounds of your estimate have been proved to be false, and that they will view all your future estimates with that degree of caution and distrust, which the past are calculated to excite." My hopes were vain. The parliament and the people, particularly the former, have continued just as quiet and as full of confidence as before. They listened, on the 13th of June last, to a repetition of the Doctor's promise to produce them a surplus of 6,500,000l. "I took the surplus at that sum in December last," said he, "and I see no reason to alter my opinion". Sapient financier!—The surplus of the consolidated fund is said to amount to 5,600,000l. One hundred thousand less would have made a deficit of a million, and we have seen (Register Vol. III. p. 615) that the Treasury people can make mistakes in their statements, when it suits their convenience. In this instance they were extremely desirous not to turn the corner, but to keep out of millions, if possible, in their deficit. We must observe, too, that the full amount of the falling off cannot be known till we come to compare the arrears and balances of last year with the arrears and balances of the year before. At the close of the year 1802 this amount was very great; and, I am pretty well informed before I see the account, that, at the close

of last year, they were left very small in amount, even uncommon exertions having been made to screw up the tax gatherers to to the last farthing, and the general account having been kept open much later, than in any former year, for the purpose of including every thing that could, by any means, be collected. It is therefore, impossible, at present, to say what the whole of the defalcation is; but, if we deduct a hundred thousand pounds, or thereabouts, for depreciation of money, we shall find, that with the difference in amount of arrears, the surplus will not amount to more than 4,600,000*l.* instead of 6,500,000*l.* or rather, instead of 7,845,000*l.* which last sum it was stated at, in the Doctor's estimate of the 10th of December, 1802.—“ Well,” some honest fellow will say, “ but these proofs of want of knowledge; these incontrovertible proofs of incapacity or duplicity, will certainly drive the Doctor from his place!” No; no, my good fellow, they will have no such effect, or tendency; for, though he has collected only 5,600,000*l.* instead of 7,845,000*l.* it is he, and he only, who has so much money to dispose of. No matter what he is, or whence he sprang: so long as he can impose new taxes and collect a good part of them, or make new loans: so long as one half of the nation are compelled to look to him for bread; so long, if he pleases, he will be minister, unless he be overset by some stroke from abroad. To detect and expose him in finance, may, in other respects, be ultimately useful; but it will never tend to eject him from his office of financier. All that he has to do, is, to get money, some how or other, and to keep up to its full establishment, his immense army of commissioners, collectors, inspectors, surveyors, supervisors, assessors, gaugers, gatherers, clerks, tide-waiters, runners, and informers; while he has, in every parish, a corps-de-garde of this vigilant and trusty army, and while this army is well and duly paid, he may safely set at defiance the opinion and the wishes of the people, the parliament, and the crown.—The reports of the debates state, that, during the speech of Lord Folkestone, Mr. Pitt left the house. Would one imagine, that even the ingenuity of the Doctor could have found, in that circumstance, an argument wherewith to reply to his lordship? It did; for, we are told, that he thereupon observed, that, “ as a proof of the correctness of his financial statements and estimates, it had not been called in question by one of the first finan-

“ ciers in Europe, who was so perfectly satisfied upon the subject, that he had not thought it worth his while to listen to the objections that were offered.” This is the sort of “ proof” that the Doctor deals in. But, in arguing upon the silence of Mr. Pitt, did he not forget, that Mr. Long, in his pamphlet of the “ More Accurate Observer,” has stated, that Mr. Pitt disapproved of the Doctor's financial measures and statements, particularly and expressly of the statement of the 10th of December, 1802, the very statement to which Lord Folkestone had referred, relative to the surplus of the Consolidated fund? Far other and far better reasons might have been given for Mr. Pitt's withdrawing himself, upon this occasion; but, without stating those reasons at present, first let the Doctor account for Mr. Pitt's silence respecting those financial statements, which Mr. Long has declared him to have disapproved of; let him account for this, before he again has recourse to such sort of “ proof” in support of himself and his miserable, exploded accounts.

THE KING'S RECOVERY.—It must give heart felt satisfaction to every one of his Majesty's subjects, that he is now officially declared to be completely restored to health. Long may that health be preserved! is the unanimous prayer of the faithful and grateful people, over whom he has so long exercised his mild and benevolent sway. At the time when his Majesty recovered from the first alarming malady, with which he was afflicted, I had not an opportunity of witnessing those expressions of joy, of affection to the King, and of gratitude to Providence, which reflected so much honour on the people of these kingdoms; but, situated in a distant colony, I saw the proofs of loyalty and affection which were exhibited by a regiment of his faithful army. The men belonging to this regiment had not the means of giving balls and of decorating their barracks with brilliant lamps, but, I remember, and I never shall forget, that they expended, in an illumination, the whole of their allowance of candles, though they well knew, that they should be obliged to sit in the dark for the rest of the week. The circumstance made, upon my mind, an impression that never has, and never can be effaced: it is amongst the causes of my attachment to the army, where, notwithstanding the sneers of such writers and speakers as Mr. Sheridan, all the higher virtues are to be found in a greater degree than in any other state of life.